Selected working papers by team members
We evaluate the potential gains from dynamic pricing in high-renewable systems using a novel model of power supply and demand response. We find that dynamic pricing increases social surplus up to 23 percent in a 100 percent renewable power system. High renewable systems, including 100 percent renewable, are remarkably affordable.
We characterize bidding equilibria and market outcomes in renewables-dominated systems. A key feature of the model is that the availability of renewable capacity is random and it is private information.
“Cooking That Kills: Cleaner Energy Access, Indoor Air Pollution, and Health ” Imelda. Working paper.
I find significant health benefits from a large scale clean energy transition, suggesting that subsidizing of cleaner-burning fuels can pay public health dividends.
“Clean Energy Access: Gender Disparity, Health, and Labor Supply ” Imelda and Anjali P. Verma. Working paper.
We investigate the implication of a large scale household clean energy transition and find that improvement in women’s health, particularly among those who spend most of their time indoors doing housework, can drive the increase in their productivity, hence allowing them to supply more market labor.
We assess landlords incentives to obtain and disclose energy efficiency certificates in the rental market. We show that incentives to provide energy efficiency information are higher in markets with higher penetration of certificates.
Work in Progress
Selected ongoing work by team members
“Real Time Pricing for Everyone” Fabra, N., D. Rapson and M. Reguant
We measure the elasticity of households’ electricity demand when faced with Real Time Prices.
“Electricity Tariff Choice: Do Consumers Dislike Price Volatility?” Fabra, N., Pareschi, F. and Reguant, M.
We estimate the determinants of electricity tariff choices by households, who face a trade-off between tariffs with volatile and low average prices versus tariffs with stable but more expensive prices.
“The Distributional Impacts of Real-Time Pricing in the Spanish Residential Electricity Market” Cahana, M., N. Fabra and M. Reguant
We examine the distributional impacts that occur as a result of the adoption of Real Time Pricing for households.
“Storing Power: Market Structure Matters” D. Andrés-Cerezo and N. Fabra
We asses firms’ incentives to operate and invest in electricity storage facilities under different market structures, including competitive and strategic storage owners in the cases in which the storage owner is integrated with a dominant electricity producer or it is a stand-alone firm. The results are key to understand how to regulate electricity storage, an issue which is critical for the deployment of renewables in electricity markets.
“Prices versus Quantities with Multiple Technologies” N. Fabra and J.P. Montero
Selected publications of the team members
“Indoor Air Pollution and Infant Mortality: A New Approach” Imelda, American Economic Association Papers & Proceedings, 2018
We evaluate the effects of a program, implemented by the Indonesian government, which promoted the substitution of kerosene by gas as cooking fuel. We find that four fewer infants died per 10,000 live births than would have in the absence of the program.
“A Primer on Capacity Mechanisms” Fabra, N., Energy Economics, 75, 323-335, 2018
We model the need and effects of capacity mechanisms in electricity markets. We find that combining price caps and capacity payments allows to disentangle the two-fold objective of inducing the right investment incentives while mitigating market power.
“Pass-through of Emissions Costs in Electricity Markets”, Fabra, N., and M. Reguant, American Economic Review, 104(9), 2872-2899, 2014
We find that the pass-through rate of carbon prices to electricity prices in the Spanish electricity market is above 80%. The high frequency of auctions and the symmetry across all firms’ technology portfolios contribute to such a high pass-through rate.
“How to Allocate Forward Contracts: the case of electricity markets”, Fabra, N., and M.-A. de Frutos, European Economic Review, 56(3), 451-469, 2012
We model strategic bidding behavior in electricity markets. We show that allocating forward contracts across firms contributes to mitigating market as long as the contract allocation makes all firms virtually symmetric.
“Market Design and Investment Incentives”, Fabra, N., N-H von der Fehr and M-A de Frutos, Economic Journal, 121, 1340-1360, 2011
We assess firms’ investment incentives in electricity generation capacity when the energy market is organized as either a uniform-price auction or a discriminatory auction. We find that investment incentives are similar across the two auction formats, while prices tend to be lower under the discriminatory auction.
“Supply Security and Short-Run Capacity Markets for Electricity”, Fabra, N., and A. Creti, Energy Economics, 29 (2), 259-276, 2007
We model the interaction between capacity markets and energy markets when nearby countries rely on scarcity pricing to induce capacity investments.
“Designing Electricity Auctions”, Fabra, N., N-H von der Fehr, and D. Harbord, Rand Journal of Economics, 37 (1), 23-46, 2006
We model strategic bidding behavior in electricity markets organized as either uniform-price auctions or discriminatory auctions. We show the latter mitigate market power, resulting in lower albeit more volatile prices.
“Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market”, Fabra, N., and J. Toro, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23 (3-4), 155-181, 2005
We study the occurrence of price wars in the Spanish electricity market. We find evidence consistent with the use of such price wars as disciplining devices among colluding firms.
“The Spanish Electricity Industry: Plus ca Change…” con Claude Crampes, Energy Journal, 26, 2005
We describe regulatory changes in the Spanish electricity market, which is embarked in an ongoing process of reform.
“Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discriminatory auctions”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 51 (3) 271-293, 2003
We show that tacit collusion is more easily sustainable under uniform-price auctions as compared to discriminatory auctions.