# **ENERGYECOLAB**

# Socio-Economic Aspects of Energy Storage ERC-EIC Energy Storage Workshop

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# Energy Storage and the Energy Transition

- The transition to carbon-free power markets requires massive investments in renewable energy.
- Electricity storage technologies play a fundamental role in smoothing the variability and intermittency of renewables.
- The widespread adoption of storage crucially depends on the investment incentives of businesses and households.
  - Incentives depend on market structure and regulation.
- And it has distributional implications:
  - Across generation technologies.
  - Across consumers.

#### Economics (and economists) come in!

# Questions from an economist's perspective

#### Grid-scale electricity storage:

- Which type of regulation to promote investments in storage?
- Does it matter who owns the storage facilities?
- Should hybrid power-storage plants be promoted?
- How does storage affect other generation technologies?
- And final consumers?

#### 2 Behind-the-meter electricity storage:

- A substitute or a complement for grid-scale storage?
- Are investment incentives affected by retail electricity pricing?
- And by the regulation of rooftop solar generation?
- What are the distributional implications across consumers?

#### **B** Hydrogen as energy storage:

- Which type of regulation to promote investments in green hydrogen?
- Does it matter what we consider to be green hydrogen?

# The Economics of Grid-Scale Electricity Storage

Do electricity markets provide socially optimal incentives to **operate** and **invest** in storage facilities?

#### The social value of electricity storage:

- Storage reduces generation costs.
- Contributes to security of supply.
- Facilitates the integration of renewables.
- Supports grid management and reduces grid investment.



### Socially Optimal Storage Decisions

#### Minimize generation costs:

- Charge when low marginal costs and discharge when high.
- Taking into account start-up/ramping costs.
- $\rightarrow\,$  This smooths production and the cost/price pattern.
- Guarantee security of supply.



Ine Duck: CAISO Total Demand and Net (of Solar and Wind) Demand for Feb 7, a (source: http://www.caiso.com/TodaysDutlook/Pages/default.aspx)

### Socially Optimal Investment Decisions

Invest so that the additional investment cost equals the additional private + social benefits:

- Reduction in production costs, start-up and ramping costs.
- Reduction in back-up capacity or grid investments.
- Reduction in future investment costs (learning economies).
- Promotion of renewable energies.



### Privately Optimal Investment Decisions

Are social and private incentives aligned? Does it matter who owns the storage facilities?

If small storage owners (no price impact):

- Charge when prices are low and discharge when high.
- $\rightarrow\,$  If prices reflect marginal costs, exposing storage to market prices induces optimal storage decisions.
- $\rightarrow$  Capacity under-investment (externalities not internalized).



### Privately Optimal Investment Decisions

If large storage owners (their decisions impact prices):

- Smooth quantities charged/discharged to avoid price effects.
- $\rightarrow$  This distorts storage decisions (smaller cost reductions).
- $\rightarrow$  Capacity under-investment.



Does it matter who owns the storage facilities? Should we allow joint ownership generation-storage?

Hotly debated question:

- California  $\rightarrow$  Utilities mandated to invest in storage capacity.
- Texas  $\rightarrow$  Utilities not permitted to own storage capacity.
- FERC  $\rightarrow$  System Operators not allowed to use storage.
- The answer should depend on the type of firm:
  - Small vs. Large storage owners.

# Vertical Integration Generation-Storage

#### Small hybrid renewable-storage plants:

- They use storage to avoid energy spills.
- Storage increases the **private** + **social value** of renewables.
  - It reduces generation costs.

#### Large vertically integrated firms:

- They smooth storage decisions to avoid price effects on its storage + generation.
- $\rightarrow$  Strong infra-utilization of storage capacity.
  - Low value of storage capacity (depresses generation profits).
- $\rightarrow$  Even larger under-investment in storage capacity.

# Some Regulatory Implications So Far

- In the absence of other instruments (e.g., subsidies, capacity markets...), under-investment in storage capacity.
- The problem is made worse when storage is in the hands of large firms, vertically integrated with generation.

#### **Regulatory solutions**

- Regulators need to decide how much storage capacity they want to procure, and provide capacity support:
  - Provide capacity payments while still exposing storage owners to the price signal.
  - Use auctions to determine capacity payments.
  - Eligibility criteria: ban large firms and incumbent generators.
- Promote hybridization renewables-storage.

## Distributional Effects of Grid-Scale Storage

#### Storage impacts electricity price patterns, affecting:

- Generators, depending on when they produce.
- Consumers, depending on when they buy.
- Distributional implications depend on:
  - Which technologies generate when (relative to when storage charges/discharges).
  - Which consumers consume when.

#### Renewable energies:

- Renewables benefit from storage as it reduces curtailment.
- Renewables that produce when storage charges (discharges) benefit from (are harmed by) storage.

#### Other generation technologies:

- Storage reduces peak prices
  - $\rightarrow$  it hurts peaking plants (hydro, CCGTs, peakers).
- Storage tends to reduce average prices
  - $\rightarrow$  it hurts base-load plants.

### Distributional Effects: across Consumers

#### Households:

- Equipment is an important determinant of consumption (heating, AC), which is also correlated with income.
- Low-income households consume relatively more during the night and winter.
- $\rightarrow$  Likely progressive impacts in solar-dominated systems (but results are highly dependent on equipment patterns).



#### Industrial consumers and SMEs:

- If they have the flexibility to consume when prices are lower, storage makes them worse off (storage smoothes prices).
- If they do not, then the effect will depend on the correlation btw their demand and prices.
  - If they consume at peak times, storage makes them better off.
  - If they consume at off-peak times, storage makes them worse off.

# The Economics of Behind-the-Meter Storage

#### Consumer-sited storage assets:

- Stand-alone batteries and storage heaters.
- Storage systems coupled with rooftop solar.
- Electric vehicle fleet.
- From a social perspective, the value of behind-the-meter generation+storage is similar to the value of hybridization.
- For private users, the value of storage is given by arbitrage profits, i.e., retail price differences (including fees & taxes).

# The Economics of Behind-the-Meter Storage

- $\rightarrow$  Incentives to invest in storage are highly dependent on retail pricing policies and rooftop solar policies:
  - Weak incentives under time-invariant retail prices and net-metering.
  - + Strong incentives under time-of-use prices or dynamic pricing, if no net-metering, and if increasing block pricing.

### Distributional Effects: across Consumers

 Storage compounds the distributional effects of behind-the-meter generation.

#### Potential for regressive distributional effects

- Investment costs  $\rightarrow$  Low-income households cannot afford it.
  - More than 80% of solar owners belong to the top 3 income quintiles (Barbose et al. (2021)).
- Price savings only for high-income households.
- Additional savings from retail prices (access tariffs, taxes...).
- But peak price reduction also benefits households without storage.

# The Economics of Hydrogen as Storage

Hydrogen can provide storage, but its development **faces challenges**.

- **1** "Chicken-and-egg" problem:
  - Demand side does not invest in hydrogen adaptation because hydrogen is not yet available.
  - Supply side does not invest in hydrogen production because there is no demand for hydrogen.
- 2 Further uncertainties facing investors:
  - Hydrogen price uncertainty.
  - Electricity and carbon price uncertainty.
  - Technological uncertainty.
  - Policy and regulatory uncertainty.

# Hydrogen as Energy Storage: Regulation

#### Blending as a "take-off" policy:

- Through auctions, gas TSO could procure green hydrogen and inject it in the gas pipelines.
  - Creates certain demand for green hydrogen.
  - Activates economies of scale and learning externalities.

#### How to define what is green H2?

- Trade-off flexible vs. stringent policies:
  - Flexible policies:
    - e.g., electricity with green certificates...
    - Stronger incentives to invest in storage at the cost of increasing electricity demand when renewables not available.
  - Stringent policies:
    - e.g., electrolyzer connected to the renewable plant...
    - Ensures electrolyzer consumes renewable electricity at the cost of making investments more costly.

### Conclusions

- Firms will have incentives to support R&D into energy storage only if they expect to benefit from it.
- 2 This is determined by market structure and regulation.
- Positive externalities created by storage often imply that a pure-market solution is not socially optimal.
- Other market failures in electricity markets (market power) might distort storage decisions.
- 5 Potentially large distributional effects must be assessed and corrected if needed.





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